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Abstract: If voting systems are to be trusted, they not only need to preserve both secrecy 
(if  requested)  and  accuracy,  but  the  mechanisms  that  presenrve  these  features  should  be 
transparent, in the sense of being both understandable and accessible. 
Secrecy and accuracy are desiderata of most voting systems. Sure enough, 
not  all  voting systems are  bound to  secrecy.  Overt  votes are  possible  or even 
requested in many circumstances, as happens with votes by raising hands. The 
rational for secrecy is  oftentimes the necessity of freeing voters  from external 
conditionings and blackmailing, and of preventing the exchange or sale of votes. 
On the other hand, all voting systems aim arguably at accuracy. In order for votes 
to count,  they must be counted in a reliable way. Accuracy breaks down in a 
number of different elements, from making sure that everyone who has the power 
to vote is actually allowed to express their vote, that those who are not entitled 
cannot cast a vote, that no one votes twice, that it is possible to tell valid from non 
valid votes, and that each valid vote figures in the sum total.
Now,  accuracy  and  secrecy  do  not  coexist  easily  in  a  voting  system. 
Intuitively,  each individual voter can assess accuracy of the system if  she can 
track her vote. But so being able to track one’s vote means, in the norm, giving up 
secrecy. Raising hands in a small assembly allows each voter to make sure that all 
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votes,  including hers,  are counted: One can see one’s voting token (the raised 
hand) in a population of other tokens. If, however, tokens are no longer connected 
with voters, so as to ensure secrecy, accuracy is delegated to counting agents, and 
is no longer assessable by the individual voter. 
Voting systems that are to win the trust of the voting body are therefore 
faced with a dilemma. On the one hand, reinforcing secrecy means delegating 
accuracy. Trust in the secrecy of the system is accompanied in potential mistrust 
in its accuracy. On the other hand, trust in accuracy can be improved, but then 
secrecy will have to be given up. 
Trust  in  accuracy has dominated some of  the  most  spectacular  debates 
about voting systems. The contested Florida results of the American Presidential 
Election of 2000 are a case in point. Most likely, the difference between the two 
candidates was below the error margin of the voting system. The recount made it 
apparent  that  the  system was  widely  inaccurate.  Even  individual  ballots  were 
subject  to  dispute  on  some  of  their  physical  properties  (a  hole  having  been 
punched according to some specifications). 
Indeed, voting systems can be inaccurate at many levels: at the level of the 
admission  of  registered  voters  at  the  poll  (some  voters  may  be  erroneously 
excluded or included; others can be allowed to vote more than once), at the level 
of  the  recording  of  the  individual  intention  (the  ballot  can  be  interpreted  in 
different ways), at the level of data transmission to a central system, and at the 
level  of  adding  votes  (both  in  local  constituencies  and  at  the  central  server). 
Weaknesses in accuracy are,  of course,  open doors to frauds of various types. 
These can occur, however, even if each step of the system is in itself accurate. On 
top of  the  accuracy of  the various  steps (local  accuracy),  a  system should be 
globally accurate, in that all steps should be implemented. 
Electronic voting systems (EVS) promise to put an end to the accuracy 
issue, at least in principle. All steps of the systems are dealt with algorithmically 
by a machine, and the whole system is but a complex machine implementing a 
comprehensive  algorithm.  Provided  the  algorithm  is  built  to  count  all  votes 
expressed, and input is fed correctly into the machine, the EVS is accurate. In 
principle, the algorithm is just a sum with a large number of addends. Provided 
addends are entered properly, the result is relatively straightforward. In particular, 
such a simple principle is understandable by the voters.
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What about secrecy? Secrecy is dealt with in EVS by requiring that only 
the machine knows the voter’s intention, which is not transmitted to anyone else. 
For instance, voting may be encrypted; voters may get a receipt that their vote has 
been cast correctly (one that does not report the voter’s choice, of course). 
Now, no matter what the specific implements for dealing with secrecy and 
accuracy, issues of trust are exacerbated by EVS. How can the individual voter 
know that her voting intention is not kept by the system in close association with 
her identity, or that her validly expressed intention is counted by the system?
Consider simple paper voting, by using a procedure that allows registration 
and ensures ballot accuracy (i.e., each entitled voter can vote once at most, and 
voter’s intentions can be expressed unambiguously on the token). What typically 
happens is that once the identity of the voter is ascertained, and her right to vote is 
confirmed, it  is  the voter herself  who takes an anonymous ballot to the cabin, 
votes  on  it,  and  drops  it  into  the  urn.  That  is,  the  link  between  registration 
accuracy (which requires  an id  check)  and the subsequent  steps  of  the  voting 
process is broken by the voter herself – the act of breaking it is literally taken by 
her in her hands. Trust in this step is hence a trivial, transparent issue, insofar as 
the mechanism implementing secrecy it is both easily understandable and actually 
accessible to the voter: the voter has only to trust herself. (It can be alleged that 
paper (or physical in general) ballots are not exempt from traceability, as each 
ballot could be identified by traces imperceptible to the naked eye. However, this 
problem can be solved by allowing voters to randomly choose their ballot from a 
pile.) 
At the next step of the voting process, ballots are dropped into an urn and 
get mixed with anyone else’s ballots; this is the final guarantee that secrecy will 
be  kept.  Trust  in  secrecy  depends  on  the  fact  that  the  voter  has  an  implicit 
knowledge of the working of the urn. She knows that unless everyone votes like 
her, or unless she is the only voter, it will be impossible to know what she have 
voted for. She also knows that it will be near impossible to figure out the order of 
ballots  from  the  pile  inside  the  urn.  Easy  to  figure  out  statistical  facts,  and 
physical properties of the urn’s content, are perfectly accessible to the voter. 
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At the further steps of the voting process, that involve counting, voters, or 
their party representatives, can be present at the count. Discussions can of course 
ensue, and disputed votes be reported, but the highly intersubjective procedure is 
within the grasp of the participants. Once the local count is over, the results are 
made available to the central system. When the final results are published, the 
local results are printed alongside with the local ones, so that each constituency 
can verify that their results are accurately reflected in the list of addends for the 
sum total. Checking the final result, at this point, is only a matter of checking a 
large sum. 
Furthermore, should doubts arise, records for each poll are kept and votes 
can be, under certain circumstances, recounted.   
The key point  here is not  simply that the whole process guarantees,  in 
principle,  both  accuracy  and  secrecy.  It  is  rather  that  the  factors  that  ensure 
accuracy and secrecy are  perfectly  transparent  to  anyone willing to  reflect  on 
them. 
EVS can be protected against fraud and errors in many ways. However, it 
is obvious that understanding the mechanisms for the protection, whatever they 
are, requires specialized knowledge, and not just the willingness to reflect upon 
the  different  phases  of  the  process.  No  matter  what  the  sophistication  of  the 
mechanism – indeed, because of that  very sophistication – the preservation of 
privacy and the accuracy of the count will be not assessable by the lay person. 
Understanding  of  electronics,  of  data  transmission,  of  encryption  will  prove 
crucial to accepting the ESV as reliable, hence to trusting it.
The accuracy of EVS can be, to a point, tested by lay people. For instance, 
spot checks, or parallel shadow voting can be run on the system, possibly during 
an election,  so  that  accuracy is  tested  on  the  fly,  as  if  it  were.  But  the  point 
remains that all those tests presuppose insider understanding of the system, and a 
complex organization to run them. Besides, were such checks routinized in EVS, 
the whole point of delegating voting to machines would become rather moot. As 
to secrecy, its testability is, to my knowledge, beyond lay access. 
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There are general objections against electronic voting. One is that voting, 
at  least  on  certain  issues,  should  not  become  an  “effortless”  procedure:  a 
difference should be kept  between voting and just  expressing an opinion,  and 
votes  are  not  opinion polls.  EVS should then be rejected because they would 
narrow the gap between voting and opinion polling. Another objection is that the 
costs of counting votes manually are not so high, and that the accuracy of manual 
systems is largely underestimated (for instance, manual counts in Switzerland are 
performed very quickly, within hours of the closure of the polls). Much as these 
objections evoke important points, the main reason for keeping manual voting is 
related to its intrinsic open structure, which can be checked simply and effectively 
at all crucial junctions by every voter, thereby enhancing trust. No matter what the 
benefits of electronic voting, these will never be enough to overcome the wide gap 
between them and manual voting on the issue of trust. 
The main result of this discussion is it is not sufficient that a voting system 
effectively protects both secrecy (if requested) and accuracy. Transparency of the 
mechanisms  that  ensure  secrecy  and  accuracy  is  a  desideratum  as  well. 
Transparency means here that the key steps of the mechanisms be both  easily  
understandable and in principle accessible to each individual voter. 
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